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# **European Patent Office Certificate Policy**

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# **Document control**

Amendment history			
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2.0	1 March 2008	Document updated following revision of certain legal instruments in connection with the entry into force of the EPC 2000	
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# GLOSSARY

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Certificate	<ul> <li>[Annex F] A certificate binds an entity's name (and other additional attributes) with the corresponding public key. A certificate must comply with ITU Recommendation X.509 version 3 and at a minimum must:</li> <li>contain a public key that corresponds to a private key under the sole control of the subject</li> <li>name or otherwise identifies its subject</li> <li>identify the CA issuing the certificate</li> <li>identify its validity period</li> <li>contain a certificate serial number</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Include end-entities e-mail addresses</li> <li>be digitally signed by the CA issuing the certificate</li> </ul>
Certificate Policy	[RFC 2527] A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. For example, a particular certificate policy might indicate applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods within a given price range.
Certificate requester	A person who applies for a smart card containing subscriber certificates in order to access the EPO's secure services. Once approved by the EPO this person is referred to as a Subscriber.
Certificate Authority	[Annex F] A CA is a trusted party that issues and revokes public key certificates for a user community. The CA is responsible for verifying the information appearing on the public key certificates. A CA is supported by CA servers, or computer systems, and the policies and procedures surrounding the operation of these servers. The term "server" refers specifically to the hardware and software that actually generates certificates and CRLs.
Certificate revocation list (CRL)	[Annex F] A time-stamped list of revoked certificates that has been digitally signed by a CA.
Certification Practice Statement (CPS)	[RFC 2527] A statement of the practices which a CA employs when issuing certificates.
Compromise	[Annex F] The unauthorized disclosure, modification, substitution or use of sensitive plain text cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters.

Cryptographic module	[Annex F] The set of hardware, software and firmware, or some combination thereof, that implements cryptographic logic or processes, including cryptographic algorithms, and is contained within the cryptographic boundary of the module.
Distinguished name	[Annex F] The unique name of each certificate holder or subscriber. Each entity in the PKI domain must have a clearly distinguishable and unique distinguished name, or DN, in the certificate subject name field.
EPO	European Patent Office
Low-level certificate	[Annex F] A digital certificate which has been issued to the applicant, for example as part of the registration of the online filing client or obtained from a certification authority, and which identifies the applicant without prior verification of the applicant's identity.
Object identifier	[Annex F] A specially formatted number that is registered with an internationally recognised standards organisation. It can, and should, be used to identify an organisation's suite of PKI policy and practice documents.
Private key	[Annex F] In public key cryptography, the private key is the portion of a public–private key pair owned by a user that is known only to that user. A user's private key is used to digitally sign data and to decrypt data that was encrypted with the user's public key.
Public key	[Annex F] In public key cryptography, the public key is the portion of a public–private key pair owned by a user that is made known to others in the user community via a public key certificate. A user's public key is used by others to encrypt data for that user and is used by others to verify the user's digital signature.
Public key infrastructure domain	[Annex F] An independent entity consisting of one or more Certificate Authorities where subscribers hold the same anchor or root certificate.

Registration authority	[Annex F] An entity responsible for identification and authentication of certificate subjects, but not for signing or issuing certificates (i.e. a Registration Authority, or RA is delegated certain tasks related to identity-proofing on behalf of a CA). The RA may delegate functions and corresponding authority to local registration authorities.
Relying party	[RFC 2527] A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate and/or digital signatures verified using that certificate.
Repository	[Annex F] A system for storing and retrieving certificates and other information relating to the certificates.
Revocation of a certificate	[Annex F] Prematurely ending the operational period of a certificate from a specified time onwards.
Smart card	Storage medium for subscriber private keys and subscriber certificates.
Subscriber	[Annex F] The entity who is the natural person named or otherwise identified in a certificate issued to that person and who holds a private key that corresponds to a public key listed in the certificate.

# Abbreviations

Annex F	Annex F, Appendix II to PCT - PKI Architecture for the e-
	PCT Standard, as in force from 1 October 2005
CA	Certificate Authority
CA for the EPO	Certificate Authority for the European Patent Office
CN	Certificate common name
СР	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate revocation list
DN	Certificate distinguished name
EPC	European Patent Convention
EPO	European Patent Office
EPO PKI	European Patent Office public key infrastructure
PCT	Patent Cooperation Treaty
PKI	Public key infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority
RA for the EPO	Registration Authority for the European Patent Office

# References

In this EPO certificate policy, references are made to the following documents:

- [Annex F] WIPO, Patent Cooperation Treaty, Administrative Instructions under the Patent Cooperation Treaty: Modifications relating to the Electronic Filing and Processing of International Applications, Annex F, Appendix II - PKI Architecture for the e-PCT Standard, as in force from 1 October 2005,
- [RFC2527] Network Working Group, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Request for Comments: 2527, Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, March 1999
- [EPC] Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) of 5 October 1973 as amended by the act revising Article 63 of the European Patent Convention of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the European Patent Convention of 29 November 2000.

# 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE CERTIFICATE POLICY

# 1.1 Overview

# 1.1.1 The European Patent Office and its online services

The European Patent Office (EPO) is the executive organ of the European Patent Organisation. It was established by the European Patent Convention (EPC) and has administrative and financial autonomy. It grants European patents using a unitary and centralised procedure (Article 4 EPC). The EPO also performs tasks under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) on the basis of Part X of the EPC.

The EPO has designed a range of online products and services to allow patent applicants, attorneys and other users to conduct their business with the EPO electronically.

# 1.1.2 Secure communications with the EPO

While a number of these products and services are available to the general public without registration, a secure environment is also provided in which permitted users can conduct secure electronic communication with the EPO.

Typically, these permitted users may be applicants or representatives (professional representatives, employees of representative firms, legal practitioners) (see Articles 133 and 134 EPC).

To facilitate the secure services it offers, the EPO provides the European Patent Office Public Key Infrastructure (EPO PKI) to permitted users. As part of this infrastructure, the Certificate Authority for the European Patent Office (CA for the EPO) issues subscriber certificates to the permitted users.

This policy document, known as the EPO Certificate Policy (CP), describes the requirements relating to the issuance, use and revocation of subscriber certificates within the EPO PKI.

# **1.1.3 Secure communications between permitted users and other industrial property institutions**

In addition to the above, the EPO makes available under specific legal and other arrangements the use of its online services for the same purpose between other national and international organisations and institutions entrusted with the task of processing patent applications and permitted users.

Provided applicable conditions and requirements are fulfilled, the EPO PKI may therefore also be made available to applicants, their representatives and other permitted users for secure communications with other national and international organisations and institutions entrusted with the task of processing patent applications.

# 1.1.4 General description of the EPO PKI

The EPO PKI consists of the following components:

- a certificate authority (the CA for the EPO), including a certificate revocation repository
- a registration authority (the RA for the EPO)
- subscribers

Subscribers are permitted users as described in sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3. Subscriber certificates are certificates that are issued on a smart card to applicants, their representatives (Articles 134(1),(8); 133(3) EPC) and any other user who needs to communicate with the EPO in electronic form as described in 1.1.1 above.

Subscriber certificates are issued at the discretion of the EPO to natural persons only and, in accordance with Annex F, are defined as 'low-level certificates'. See also section 3, Identification and authentication, and section 7, Certificate and CRL profiles.

Subscriber certificates may be relied on by those Relying Parties as further detailed in the CP.

# 1.1.5 Legal basis for the EPO PKI

The legal basis for the electronic filing of European patent applications, international (PCT) applications and other documents with the EPO and with the competent national authorities where so permitted is provided in Rule 2 EPC and Rule 89bis. 1 and 2 PCT.

Based on the above legal basis, the Decision of the President of the European Patent Office, dated 12 July 2007 concerning the electronic signatures, data carriers and software to be used for the electronic filing of patent applications and other documents (Special Edition No. 3, OJ EPO 2007, A5), the Decision of the President of the European Patent Office dated 26 February 2009 concerning the electronic filing of documents (OJ EPO 2009, 182) and the Decision of the President of the European Patent Office dated 8 February 2010 concerning the EPO Online Filing software to be used for the electronic filing of documents (OJ EPO 2010, 226) provide stipulations regarding such electronic filings, including the use of electronic signatures.

The EPO PKI meets the requirements set forth in Part 7 and Annex F (Electronic filing and processing of international applications) of the Administrative Instructions under the PCT. The documents associated with the EPO PKI derive, where applicable, their content and definitions from these sources.

The legal basis for electronic communications by the Subscriber with other designated parties depends on the applicable rules and regulations for communications with such parties and must be obtained from them.

# 1.2 Identification

The title of this document is the European Patent Office Certificate Policy.

A unique document identifier (object identifier) has not been assigned to this document.

# **1.3 Community and applicability**

The EPO provides services as a CA to Subscribers. In order to provide these services, the EPO maintains the EPO PKI, which consists of several technical components.

This section contains a description of the components of the EPO PKI and describes the applicability of the certificates issued within the EPO PKI.

# **1.3.1 Certificate Authorities**

The CA active within the EPO PKI is the CA for the European Patent Office. This CA for the EPO issues all Subscriber certificates.

The certificate of the CA for the EPO has been certified by the CA for the European Patent Organisation. This latter root CA may issue certificates for subordinate EPO CAs if required.

# 1.3.2 RA for the EPO

The RA for the EPO is responsible for the identification and authentication of certificate requesters within the EPO PKI.

# 1.3.3 Subscribers

Subscribers are natural persons who use the certificates and private keys generated within the EPO PKI and stored on a smart card.

# 1.3.4 Relying Parties

# 1.3.4.1 EPO

The EPO shall be a Relying Party in respect of the CP.

# 1.3.4.2 Receiving Office

Other entities may be Relying Parties, provided that they qualify under the PCT as a receiving Office (see Article 10 PCT), and that as a receiving Office they have notified the International Bureau (see Section 703 Administrative Instructions) that they are prepared to receive international applications in electronic form and indicate, amongst others, that they accept the CA for the EPO for the issuance of certificates for the purpose of the electronic signature required to be used with the international filing (see Section 710(a) under (vi) Administrative Instructions).

The International Bureau is required to publish the notification referred to above (see Section 710(c) Administrative Instructions).

The scope of the Relying Party's entitlement under the above parameters to rely on certificates issued by the CA for the EPO is restricted to the PCT-related actions for which an electronic signature is required. Enlargement of the Relying Party's scope of entitlement to rely on certificates requires a legal basis in addition to the present paragraph.

# 1.3.4.3 Central industrial property office

Other entities may be Relying Parties, provided that they operate as a central industrial property office of either an EPC contracting state or a state which is not a party to the EPC but which has been designated by the EPO as a Relying Party. For this purpose, the EPO may where applicable set requirements and conditions to be fulfilled by the central industrial property office concerned.

# 1.3.4.4 Intergovernmental organisations

Certain entities which operate as intergovernmental organisations entrusted with the task of granting patents may be Relying Parties, provided that the EPO has designated them as such. For this purpose, the EPO may where applicable set requirements and conditions to be fulfilled by the intergovernmental organisation concerned.

# 1.3.5 Applicability

The EPO smart card contains two types of Subscriber certificate: authentication certificates, with which Subscribers can authenticate themselves to a network environment, and non-repudiation certificates, with which Subscribers can apply an electronic signature to a document.

Subscriber certificates may only be used in connection with services provided by the EPO or a Relying Party.

# 1.4 Contact details

# 1.4.1 Certificate Policy administration organisation

The EPO's Security and Audit directorate is responsible for maintenance of the CP document.

# 1.4.2 Contact for enquiries

Copies of this document can be downloaded from NEED URL HERE for EPO-Smartcards In addition, enquires may be addressed to,eBusiness User Support, European Patent Office, Bayerstrasse 35, 80335 München, Germany, Tel.: +31 (0)70 340 4500, e-mail: support@epo.org

# **1.4.3 Body determining Certificate Practice Statement suitability for the policy**

The body which determines whether the Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) complies with this policy is named in section 1.4.1, Certificate Policy administration organisation.

# 1.5 Entry into force/transitional law

The CP entered into force on the date indicated on the cover page as the effective date.

The release date as mentioned in the CP is the date on which the current version of the CP was released and made available for publication in accordance with section 2.6.

In the event that the effective date is earlier than the release date, this section 1.5 confirms that the stipulations of the CP shall apply retroactively to the EPO PKI as from that effective date.

Unless stipulated otherwise in the CP, the latest version of the CP will be the applicable policy and will therefore also apply to all certificates issued before its effective date.

Any further revisions of the CP will take effect for the operation of the EPO PKI as from the effective date indicated on the revised document.

The above stipulations shall also apply to any other documents associated with the CP (and its later versions), such as, but not limited to, the CPS, Subscriber agreements and Relying Party agreements.

# 2. GENERAL PROVISIONS

# 2.1 Obligations

# 2.1.1 CA for the EPO obligations

The CA for the EPO shall perform the specific obligations as required by the CP and/or by related documentation based on the CP, including the CPS. Amongst other obligations the CA for the EPO shall:

- act in accordance with the terms of the CP and the applicable CPS.
- take reasonable measures to ensure that its own private key remains confidential and provide a secure environment to control its use and access.
- provide access to the CP for permitted users of the EPO PKI.
- issue Subscriber certificates to Subscribers upon receipt of a valid request from the RA for the EPO, in accordance with the terms of the CPS.
- revoke Subscriber certificates when in receipt of a valid revocation request, and inform the Subscriber of the revocation, in accordance with the terms of the CP.
- post issued Subscriber certificates to the repository (note: access to this repository is restricted to authorised parties).
- generate key pairs for Subscribers on the smart card, forward Subscriber certificate requests to the CA for the EPO for certification, return the Subscriber certificate to the smart card and mail the Subscriber the PIN of the smart card.
- generate a certificate revocation list (CRL) and publish the CRL in the repository.

# 2.1.2 RA for the EPO obligations

The RA for the EPO shall perform the specific obligations as required by the CP and/or by related documentation based on the CP, including the CPS. Amongst other obligations the RA for the EPO shall:

- act in accordance with the terms of the CP and the applicable CPS.
- ensure that certificate requests are valid.
- receive and process applications for Subscriber certificates.
- receive revocation requests from authorised parties (section 4.4.2), make reasonable enquiries to establish the validity of these requests, and forward validated requests to the CA for the EPO.
- inform the Subscriber and the CA for the EPO of the revocation of the Subscriber certificate.

# 2.1.3 Subscriber obligations

The Subscriber shall perform the specific obligations as required by the CP and/or by related documentation based on the CP, including the CPS and, where applicable, the Subscriber Agreement. Amongst other obligations the Subscriber shall:

- ensure that the public and private keys and Subscriber certificates are only used in accordance with the terms of the CP.
- provide accurate and complete information when requesting a certificate.
- ensure that the private key and PIN protecting the smart card which stores the private key are protected at all times against loss, disclosure to any unauthorised party, modification and unauthorised use in accordance with the CP.
- ensure that knowledge of the Subscriber PIN is restricted to the Subscriber.

 submit a revocation request to the RA for the EPO immediately in the event of an actual or suspected compromise of the private keys, PIN or smart card, or any change to the information provided as part of the certificate application.

# 2.1.4 Relying Party obligations

The Relying Party shall perform the specific obligations as required by the CP and/or by related documentation based on the CP, including the CPS and, where applicable, a Relying Party Agreement. Amongst other obligations the Relying Party shall:

- independently assess the appropriateness of the use of a certificate for any given purpose and determine that the certificate will, in fact, be used for an appropriate purpose.
- check for certificate revocation or suspension prior to accepting verification of a certificate.

# 2.2 Liability

# 2.2.1 Scope of the EPO's liability

# 2.2.1.1

By operating the EPO PKI, especially by signing a certificate which indicates the use of the CP, the EPO shall ensure, to all who reasonably rely (see 1.3.4) on the information contained in the certificate, only that its certification and repository services, issuance and revocation of certificates, and issuance of CRLs are in accordance with the CP. The EPO shall be restricted to making reasonable efforts to ensure that the Subscribers and Relying Parties follow the requirements of the CP when dealing with any certificates containing a reference to the CP or the associated keys (see 2.2.4).

# 2.2.1.2

The EPO shall not be liable for any consequences arising from any use of certificates issued under the CP other than for communications between the EPO and permitted users (see 1.1.2 and 1.3.4.1). The EPO shall not be liable for the use of certificates issued under the CP for communications between permitted users and other industrial property institutions or any other third parties (see 1.1.3 and 1.3.4.2 / 1.3.4.3 / 1.3.4.4). This shall not prejudice the liability, if any, of Relying Parties towards the Subscribers concerned.

# 2.2.2 Limitation of liability

# 2.2.2.1

The availability of the EPO PKI may be affected by system maintenance or repair or factors outside the control of the EPO. The EPO therefore disclaims any liability for non-availability of the EPO PKI.

# 2.2.2.2

Claims for damages are excluded unless the EPO has caused the damage wilfully or through gross negligence, or the damage consists of an injury to life, limb or health, or the obligation breached is of a fundamental nature. In the latter case, if the claimant is not a

consumer (within the meaning of Article 13 of the German Civil Code), the EPO's liability shall be limited to typical and foreseeable damages.

# 2.2.3 The law governing the EPO's liability

Without prejudice to the governing law provision (2.4.1), liability claims against the EPO shall be governed by Article 9 EPC. For the purposes of the application of Article 9(1) and (2) EPC, the applicable law shall be German law.

# 2.2.4 Subscriber and Relying Party liability

Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall reflect the EPO's limited liability as laid down in section 2.2 of the CP, and these agreements shall, where applicable, require Subscribers/Relying Parties to warrant that they comply with the obligations set out in sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 respectively.

# 2.3 Financial responsibility

# 2.3.1 Indemnification by Relying Parties

To the extent permitted by applicable law, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall require Subscribers/Relying Parties to indemnify the EPO for any consequences resulting from failure to comply with the requirements laid down in such agreements or elsewhere in the EPO PKI documentation.

# 2.3.2 Fiduciary relationships

The issuance of certificates shall not make the CA for the EPO an agent, fiduciary, trustee or other representative of Subscribers or Relying Parties.

# 2.3.3 Administrative processes

No stipulation.

# 2.4 Interpretation and enforcement

# 2.4.1 Governing law

# 2.4.1.1 Governing law

The governing law shall be as laid down in the European Patent Convention and the rules and regulations based thereon. The PCT, the rules and other regulations based thereon are applicable to the extent foreseen in or under the EPC or in the CP. Subsidiarily, German law applies, to the exclusion of recourse to the German law of conflicts.

This governing law provision shall apply to the CP and other documents relating to the EPO PKI based on the CP, such as the CPS, Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements, unless indicated otherwise in such documents.

This governing law provision shall not preclude the applicability of other national law provisions in the relationship between Relying Parties on the one hand and Subscribers on the other hand. The latter sentence does not apply to the EPO.

This governing law provision is based on the principle that uniform procedures and interpretation must be ensured for all parties involved in the EPO PKI, no matter where they are located.

# 2.4.1.2 Privileges and immunities accorded to the EPO

The CP shall be interpreted in such a way that the rights of the European Patent Organisation as described in the EPC, including the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Patent Organisation, signed in Munich on 5 October 1973, are in all cases preserved.

# 2.4.2 Miscellaneous

In the event that any one or more of the provisions of the CP shall for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable at law, such unenforceability shall not affect any other provision, but the CP shall then be construed as if such unenforceable provision or provisions had never been contained herein and, insofar as possible, construed to maintain the original intent of the CP.

No term or provision of the CP may be amended, waived, supplemented, modified or terminated, except in accordance with the procedures as set forth in the CP.

Any notice, consent, request or other communication by the CA for the EPO under the CP shall be in paper or electronic form.

# 2.4.3 Dispute resolution procedures

If a dispute arises in connection with the operation of the EPO PKI, the CP, the CPS or any other document relating to the EPO PKI, the parties shall undertake in good faith to use all reasonable endeavours to settle the dispute by negotiation.

Any dispute arising out of or in connection with the operation of the EPO PKI and in which the EPO is a party shall be finally settled by binding arbitration with one single arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). The venue for arbitration shall be Munich.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, if the EPO waives its immunity from national jurisdiction, the courts of Munich shall have jurisdiction for any such dispute.

Where under applicable patent law an event arising out of the operation of the EPO PKI allows a party to seek resolution, the judicial means provided thereunder shall take precedence over the above-indicated dispute resolution procedures. Section 2.4.1.2 applies.

Subscriber Agreements and Relying Party Agreements shall contain a dispute resolution clause, which shall include the above-mentioned principles unless specific circumstances necessitate deviation therefrom.

# 2.5 Fees

The fees for Subscribers and Relying Parties for using the EPO PKI, performing certificate management actions, using the smart card and any other component or service mentioned in the CP or the CPS shall be included in the fees for the services rendered by the EPO or mentioned separately.

# 2.5.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees

Smart cards, certificates and supporting software shall normally be available to Subscribers free of charge. However, the EPO reserves the right to charge a fee under certain circumstances.

# 2.5.2 Certificate access fees

The EPO shall not normally charge a fee for making certificates available to Relying Parties.

# 2.5.3 Revocation or status information access fees

Revocation information shall be available free of charge.

# 2.5.4 Fees for other services such as policy information

The EPO shall not charge a fee for access to policy information such as that in the CP or the CPS.

# 2.5.5 Refund policy

No stipulation.

# 2.6 Publication and repository

# 2.6.1 Publication of CA for the EPO information

The EPO shall publish (as a minimum by means of a website accessible via the Internet) the following information in the repository:

- EPO Certificate Policy
- EPO Certification Practice Statement
- CA for the European Patent Organisation certificate (root certificate)
- Relying Party Agreement
- Subscriber Agreement
- CA for the EPO certificate
- CRL repository

# 2.6.2 Frequency of publication

The CA for the EPO shall publish the information stipulated in section 2.6.1 above as soon as said information becomes available to it.

# 2.6.3 Access controls

The CA for the EPO shall control access to its repository to prevent the updating or deletion of the information they contain by any other party.

# 2.6.4 Repositories

The CA for the EPO shall maintain repositories for the publication of Subscriber certificates and CRLs.

# 2.7 Compliance audit

# 2.7.1 Frequency of entity compliance audit

The EPO shall carry out periodic and ad hoc inspections and audits of its site and operations to check that they are functioning in accordance with the security practices and procedures set forth in its CPS. It shall also contract with an external auditor to conduct an independent annual audit.

# 2.7.2 Identity/qualifications of auditor

An external auditor shall conduct an independent audit once a year. The auditor shall be an employee of a competent professional firm that complies with appropriate national and international standards and codes of practice.

# 2.7.3 Auditor's relationship to audited party

The performance and reporting of the audit shall be governed by a contract between the auditor and the audited party.

# 2.7.4 Topics covered by audit

The audit shall determine the compliance of EPO PKI systems and processes with the EPO CP and CPS. It shall determine the business risks of non-compliance with the CP and CPS in accordance with the identified control objectives.

# 2.7.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency

The EPO shall take such action as it deems necessary and appropriate to resolve deficiencies resulting from the audit.

# 2.7.6 Communication of results

The EPO shall be responsible for operating the EPO PKI in accordance with the applicable requirements and controls. The detailed audit report will therefore be issued to the EPO only.

# 2.8 Confidentiality

# 2.8.1 Types of information to be kept confidential

- The EPO shall protect the contents of any certificate application or revocation request, whether successful or unsuccessful, as confidential to the CA for the EPO and the Subscriber/requester, except in the circumstances mentioned in 2.8.2 to 2.8.7.
- The EPO shall keep detailed security and operations documentation confidential to Subscribers and Relying Parties. The EPO shall, however, disclose these documents to the appointed auditor on request.

# 2.8.2 Types of information not considered confidential

The EPO shall not consider any information contained in a certificate, CRL or the CP as confidential.

# 2.8.3 Disclosure of certificate revocation/suspension information

CRL contents as well as the individual status of any certificate shall be freely disclosed to any Relying Party.

# 2.8.4 Release to law enforcement officials

The EPO shall be entitled to disclose information it holds in its capacity as CA or RA or otherwise in connection with the execution of the EPO PKI, to the extent that such disclosure is allowed for by the law governing the CP, and is based on verifiable and appropriate legal instruments (such as court orders). The aforementioned is without prejudice to the EPO's privileges and immunities.

# 2.8.5 Release as part of civil discovery

The EPO shall be entitled to disclose any confidential information relating to a particular Subscriber as required by civil discovery to the extent that such disclosure is allowed for by the law governing the CP, and is based on a verifiable and appropriate legal basis. The aforementioned shall be without prejudice to the EPO's privileges and immunities.

# 2.8.6 Disclosure upon owner's request

The EPO shall undertake to disclose to a Subscriber on request any confidential information relating to that Subscriber.

# 2.8.7 Other information release circumstances

No stipulation.

# 2.9 Intellectual property rights

All intellectual property rights relating to Subscriber certificates and the CP belong to and shall remain the property of the EPO.

# 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

# 3.1 Initial registration

# 3.1.1 Types of name

The CA for the EPO shall identify itself and Subscribers by distinguished names (DN) using the attributes defined by the ITU-T X.501 standard for distinguished names.

# 3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that the set of attributes uniquely identifies each Subscriber and has meaningful values.

# 3.1.3 Rules for interpreting various name forms

No stipulation.

# 3.1.4 Uniqueness of names

The CA for the EPO shall allocate the set of names according to 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 in such a way that they are unambiguous. The CA for the EPO shall reject certificate applications where the name does not sufficiently distinguish the certificate requester from an existing Subscriber's DN.

# 3.1.5 Name claim dispute resolution procedure

The CA for the EPO shall resolve any disputes that may arise over the allocation of names by reasonable endeavours to contact the certificate requester and agree, for example, that the CN attribute be modified to disambiguate the DN.

# 3.1.6 Recognition, authentication and role of trade marks

The CA for the EPO shall not be required to seek any evidence of trade marks.

# 3.1.7 Method to prove possession of private key

Not applicable as Subscriber keys are generated by the CA for the EPO.

# 3.1.8 Authentication of organisation identity

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS methods for authenticating the identity of an organisation.

# 3.1.9 Authentication of individual identity

Before a certificate is issued to a certificate requester, the identity of the requester shall be authenticated by the RA for the EPO in accordance with the registration procedures. The RA for the EPO shall take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of the certificate requester.

# 3.2 Routine rekey

If their certificate is still valid, Subscribers shall identify themselves using their current smart card. If the certificate has expired then the process for renewing it shall be the same as for initial registration.

# 3.3 Rekey after revocation

The identification and authentication process for rekeying after revocation shall be the same as the process for initial registration.

# 3.4 Revocation request

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the precise identification and authentication procedures and measures required to authenticate revocation requests.

# 4. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

# 4.1 Certificate application

For each certificate application requesters shall:

- authenticate themselves to the RA for the EPO in accordance with the requirements specified in section 33.
- apply for a (new) private key generated and protected according to this policy or present a public key and prove possession of the corresponding private key together with proof that it has been generated and protected in accordance with this policy.
- present personal information to be certified and/or filed along with the certificate application.

The CA for the EPO and RA for the EPO shall take all reasonable care in accepting and processing certificate applications. The CA for the EPO shall document detailed procedures for processing certificate applications.

# 4.2 Certificate issuance

The issuance of a certificate by the CA for the EPO shall indicate complete and final approval of the certificate application by the CA for the EPO.

The production process for certificates and the private keys and tokens associated with the certificate shall consist of five clearly distinguishable parts (or functions) with their corresponding separate subsystems.

The five functions are:

- 1 Key generation
- 2 Storage in token
- 3 Creation of certificates
- 4 Generation of PINs
- 5 Distribution and delivery

# 4.3 Certificate acceptance

Subscribers must acknowledge receipt of their smart card. This acknowledgement shall be deemed as conveying acceptance of the certificate.

# 4.4 Certificate revocation

Certificates shall be revoked when they become invalid or are no longer trustworthy.

# 4.4.1 Circumstances for revocation

Subscribers may request revocation of their certificates. Reasons for revoking a certificate include, but are not limited to, the following circumstances:

- Theft, loss, disclosure, modification or other compromise or suspected compromise of the Subscriber's private key, PIN or smart card.
- Deliberate misuse of keys and/or certificate(s) by the Subscriber.

- Substantial non-observance of operational requirements laid down in the CP or other relevant documents (e.g. Subscriber Agreements).
- Certificate information becomes or is found to be inaccurate.
- Improper (e.g. certificate information is not correct) or faulty issuance of a certificate.
- Denial by the EPO to the Subscriber of access rights to any product or service.

# 4.4.2 Who can request revocation

The following entities shall be authorised to request revocation of a Subscriber certificate:

- the holder of the certificate (Subscriber)
- the employer of the Subscriber
- the RA for the EPO
- the CA for the EPO
- other parties authorised by the EPO.

# 4.4.3 Procedure for revocation request

The EPO shall specify or reference the procedure for requesting revocation in its CPS.

# 4.4.4 Revocation request grace period

The EPO shall specify or reference the revocation request period in its CPS.

# 4.4.5 Circumstances for suspension

Suspension is not supported within the EPO PKI.

# 4.4.6 Who can request suspension

Suspension is not supported within the EPO PKI.

# 4.4.7 Procedure for suspension request

Suspension is not supported within the EPO PKI.

# 4.4.8 Limits on suspension period

Suspension is not supported within the EPO PKI.

# 4.4.9 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)

- The CA for the EPO shall re-issue its CRL every 24 hours, even if no changes to the CRL have been made.
- Every CRL shall denote the time for the next CRL issue in accordance with ITU-T X.509. A new CRL may be published before the stated time.

# 4.4.10 CRL checking requirements

See Relying Party obligations.

# 4.4.11 Online revocation/status checking availability

No stipulation.

# 4.4.12 Online revocation checking requirements

No stipulation.

# 4.4.13 Other forms of revocation advertisement available

No stipulation.

# **4.4.14** Checking requirements for other forms of revocation advertisement No stipulation.

# 4.4.15 Special requirements regarding key compromise

No stipulation.

# 4.5 Security audit procedures

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS how routine and exceptional events are to be recorded, how logs - both off-line (paper) and online (electronic) - are to be kept, and how periodic and ad-hoc investigations are to be conducted in order to audit on a continuous basis the security of the site, its users (i.e. management and operations staff employed or retained by the CA for the EPO) and its operations. The following stipulations represent the minimum standard required.

# 4.5.1 Types of event recorded

Records of events shall include relevant details, CA for the EPO users/staff involved, times and dates, and, where appropriate, the status of the event (successful or unsuccessful). The CPS shall contain a full specification of the types of event recorded.

# 4.5.2 Frequency of processing log

Online logs shall be processed every working day to identify actual or suspected security breaches.

# 4.5.3 Retention period for audit log

Logs shall be retained for at least seven years.

# 4.5.4 Protection of audit log

Online logs shall be protected against modification, e.g. by write-protecting relevant media as appropriate.

# 4.5.5 Audit log backup procedures

- A copy of each online log shall be kept at an off-site secure location.
- It shall be possible to examine logs during their retention period.

# 4.5.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)

Audit logs shall be created on all EPO PKI systems.

# 4.5.7 Notification to event-causing subject

No stipulation.

# 4.5.8 Vulnerability assessments

See 2.7.

# 4.6 Archiving records

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the measures taken to generate and maintain archives of its operations. The stipulations below represent the minimum standard required.

# 4.6.1 Types of event recorded

Records shall include all relevant evidence in the CA for the EPO's possession, including:

- certificate applications and any related messages
- correspondence and contracts with other parties
- CA for the EPO rekeying information, including key identifiers and CA certificates
- revocation requests and messages exchanged with the originator of the request and/or the Subscriber
- audit journals including records of annual auditing of the CA for the EPO.

# 4.6.2 Retention period for archive

- The CA for the EPO shall ensure that archive records are kept for a period of at least seven years.
- If the original media cannot retain the data for the required period, the CA for the EPO shall operate procedures to ensure archived data is periodically moved to new media.
- The CA for the EPO shall maintain the applications required to process archive data for as long as may be needed.

# 4.6.3 Protection of archive

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that no entity can modify or delete the archive.

# 4.6.4 Archive backup procedures

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that archive data is stored off-site in a segregated, secure facility.

# 4.6.5 Archive collection system (internal or external)

Archives shall be collected internally.

# 4.6.6 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that only authorised personnel may obtain archive information.

# 4.7 Key changeover

- The CA for the EPO shall generate a new certificate signing and verification key pair, employing a key splitting/sharing scheme, and generate a CA for the EPO certificate at least three months prior to the expiration of the old private CA for the EPO key.
- Changing a CA for the EPO key pair shall involve the same security procedures as during the original creation.
- The CA for the EPO shall ensure that key changeover causes minimal disruption to any subordinate entities in the CA for the EPO chain of trust.

# 4.8 Compromise and disaster recovery

The EPO shall develop a comprehensive business continuity plan in order to assure continued operation without compromise in the event of disaster. The EPO shall include or reference the business continuity plan in its CPS.

In the event of actual or suspected compromise of the CA for the EPO's private key, the EPO shall immediately notify all subordinate entities within the CA for the EPO's chain of trust. Where the CA for the EPO certificate is revoked, all subordinate certificates shall also be revoked.

# 4.9 CA for the EPO termination

The CA for the EPO shall notify its Subscriber community of the expiry of the CA for the EPO certificate at least six months prior to its expiry.

Termination of a CA is defined as when all service associated with the CA ceases permanently. It does not apply when the service is transferred from one organisation to another, or when an old CA for the EPO key pair is changed for a new CA for the EPO key pair.

# 5. PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS

# 5.1 Physical controls

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the physical controls needed to fulfil the requirements of the CP, the physical controls needed to meet any further requirements it may identify, and any division of responsibilities into roles intended to facilitate the operation of physical controls.

# 5.1.1 Site location and construction

The CA for the EPO shall take reasonable measures to locate its site in secure accommodation such that any party or exterior walls and any ceilings and roofs that could otherwise afford unauthorised access are at least of brick, tile, concrete or aggregate construction. Walls must connect at both top and bottom with floors and ceilings/roofs (i.e. they must penetrate suspended ceilings or floors that could afford access via void spaces).

# 5.1.2 Physical access

The CA for the EPO shall restrict physical access at its site by means of locks, entry control and intruder detection systems as appropriate.

#### 5.1.3 Power and air conditioning

- The CA for the EPO shall take reasonable measures to employ at its site sufficient power supply protection to mitigate the risk of malfunction of critical processing equipment due to mains power interruption, spikes or surges.
- The CA for the EPO shall take reasonable measures to employ sufficient air conditioning at its site to mitigate the risk of malfunction of critical processing equipment due to overheating.

# 5.1.4 Water exposure

The CA for the EPO shall take reasonable measures to protect its site from exposure to flooding (including both external incursion and leakage of water coolant and/or heating systems) within its site that could affect critical processing operations.

# 5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

The CA for the EPO shall take reasonable measures to protect its site from fire that could affect computers, media, equipment or paper records.

# 5.1.6 Media storage

The CA for the EPO shall store removable media securely.

# 5.1.7 Waste disposal

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that any paper records or media bearing confidential information are disposed of securely.

# 5.1.8 Off-site backup

Routine off-site backups of critical system data, audit log data and other sensitive information shall be performed.

# 5.2 Procedural controls

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the procedural controls needed to fulfil the requirements of the CP, the procedural controls needed to meet any further requirements it may identify, and any division of responsibilities into roles intended to facilitate the operation of procedural controls.

# 5.2.1 Trusted roles

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the trusted roles within the secure environment.

# 5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the number of persons required per task.

# 5.3 Personnel controls

The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the personnel controls needed to fulfil the requirements of the CP, the personnel controls needed to meet any further requirements it may identify, and any division of responsibilities into roles intended to facilitate the operation of personnel controls.

# 5.3.1 Background, qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

The CA for the EPO shall employ or retain staff in accordance with the background, qualifications, experience and clearance requirements it specifies in its CPS.

# 5.3.2 Background check procedures

The CA for the EPO shall require all personnel to prove their identity and qualifications by means of appropriate documentation.

# 5.3.3 Training requirements

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that all personnel performing operations are appropriately trained.

# 5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that any personnel performing operations can receive retraining as appropriate.

# 5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence

The CA for the EPO shall specify or reference in its CPS the frequency and sequence of job rotation.

# 5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorised actions

The CA for the EPO shall apply sanctions for unauthorised actions up to and including summary dismissal in the event of violation of the terms of the CP, its CPS, or other policies and procedures.

# 5.3.7 Contract personnel requirements

The CA for the EPO shall take appropriate measures to ensure that independent contractors or consultants involved in the operation of the EPO PKI provide all services with due diligence and care and that they use sufficiently qualified staff for this purpose.

#### 5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that all personnel performing CA for the EPO operations are supplied with manuals, work instructions and/or technical specifications as appropriate.

# 6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

#### 6.1 Key pair generation and installation

#### 6.1.1 Key pair generation

- The CA for the EPO shall employ one or more separate hardware cryptographic modules that have been certified as meeting the FIPS PUB 140-1 standard to at least Security Level 3 to generate certificate signing and verification key pairs.
- Subscriber key pairs will be generated on the cards by the CA for the EPO.

#### 6.1.2 Private key delivery to entity

Private keys are generated, stored on smart cards and delivered to the Subscriber by the CA for the EPO.

#### 6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer

Public keys shall be provided to the CA for the EPO in accordance with a PKCS#10 certificate request.

#### 6.1.4 CA for the EPO public key and CRL delivery to permitted users

The CA for the EPO public key is available to permitted users on request via a durable means of communication, such as the Internet. The CRL distribution point shall be specified in the CPS.

#### 6.1.5 Key sizes

CA for the EPO keys shall have a minimum length of 2048 bits. Subscriber keys shall have a minimum length of 1024 bits.

#### 6.1.6 Public key parameters generation

No stipulation

# 6.1.7 Parameter quality checking

No stipulation

#### 6.1.8 Hardware/software key generation

The CA for the EPO key generation is performed in a cryptographic module that complies with at least FIPS PUB 140-1 level 3.

# 6.1.9 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

For ITU-T X.509 Version 3 certificates, the KeyUsage extension of certificates is used in accordance with RFC 2459: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile.

#### 6.2 Private key protection

# 6.2.1 Standards for cryptographic module

The CA for the EPO shall employ a hardware cryptographic module that has been certified as meeting the FIPS PUB 140-1 standard to at least Security Level 3 to protect the CA for the EPO private key.

# 6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

Access to the CA for the EPO private key is divided between multiple persons. A minimum N out of M persons are required before access to the keys is possible. The CA for the EPO shall specify in its CPS the precise controls implemented.

# 6.2.3 Private key escrow

Keys within the EPO PKI are not escrowed.

# 6.2.4 Private key backup

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that the key splitting/sharing scheme supports recreation of the private key for disaster recovery purposes.

# 6.2.5 Private key archival

Expired, inactive private signing keys will not be archived, but will be destroyed in accordance with section 6.2.9.

# 6.2.6 Private key entry into cryptographic module

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that the key splitting/sharing scheme provides for secure entry of the private key into the cryptographic module.

# 6.2.7 Method of activating private keys

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that the key splitting/sharing scheme provides for effective and secure activation of the private key.

# 6.2.8 Method of deactivating private keys

The CA for the EPO shall ensure the appropriate deactivation of CA, RA and subscriber keys.

# 6.2.9 Method of destroying private keys

The CA for the EPO shall ensure that deactivated CA for the EPO private keys are irrevocably destroyed.

# 6.3 Other aspects of key pair management

# 6.3.1 Public key archival

The CA for the EPO shall retain for archive purposes copies of all Subscriber public keys.

# 6.3.2 Usage periods for public and private keys

CA for the European Patent Organisation keys have a usage period of 20 years. CA for the EPO keys have a usage period of 10 years. Subscriber keys have a usage period of 3 years.

# 6.4 Activation data

# 6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

The CA for the EPO shall employ activation data such as passwords or PINs to control access to computers, equipment and physical areas within its site as appropriate.

# 6.4.2 Activation data protection

The CA for the EPO shall define and apply an appropriate policy for its staff (managers and operators employed or retained by the CA for the EPO) to protect passwords or PINs with which they are issued.

# 6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data

No stipulation.

# 6.5 Computer security controls

# 6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

The CA for the EPO shall employ computer security controls where appropriate to identify individual users, authenticate individual users by means of a password or PIN, limit access to data and functions in accordance with the user's role and privileges, and record by means of an online log (audit trail) security-relevant events.

# 6.5.2 Computer security rating

Not applicable. See section 6.1.1.

# 6.6 Life cycle technical controls

# 6.6.1 System development controls

The CA for the EPO shall employ development controls where appropriate to ensure all software and hardware is created, integrated, tested, configured, installed, commissioned and maintained in accordance with the CA for the EPO's business objectives. It shall employ appropriate goods-inwards procedures for bought-in items.

# 6.6.2 Security management controls

The CA for the EPO shall establish a security organisation and shall manage and control all security activities associated with system development and operation.

# 6.6.3 Life cycle security ratings

Not applicable.

# 6.7 Network security controls

The CA for the EPO shall protect its internal communications networks from unauthorised access, including access via any connected external networks. It shall employ a firewall to protect each such connection. It shall configure each firewall with an appropriate security policy restricting the passage of data between the networks to the minimum necessary to accomplish its business objectives, and analysing incoming data for virus contamination

as appropriate. It shall conduct routine and ad hoc analyses of firewall operation to detect actual or suspected breaches of security.

# 6.8 Cryptographic module engineering controls

No stipulation.

# 7. CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES

Certificates provided to Subscribers are defined, in accordance with the definition in Annex F to the PCT, as low-level certificates.

# 7.1 Certificate profile

Subscriber certificates shall conform to RFC 2459.

# 7.1.1 Version number(s)

CA for the EPO and subscriber certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates.

# 7.1.2 Certificate extensions

The CA for the EPO shall implement a single non-critical Certificate Policy certificate extension in accordance with RFC 2459 with policy qualifiers on each certificate.

# 7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

Identifiers as defined by RFC 2459 shall be used.

#### 7.1.4 Name forms

See 3.1.1

# 7.1.5 Name constraints

No stipulation.

# 7.1.6 Certificate Policy object identifier

See section 1.2.

# 7.1.7 Usage of policy constraints extension

No stipulation.

# 7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics

No stipulation.

# 7.1.9 Processing semantics for critical Certificate Policy extensions

No stipulation.

# 7.2 CRL profile

# 7.2.1 Version number(s)

CRLs issued under this policy shall be constructed according to ITU-T x.509 and RFC 2459.

# 7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions

No stipulation.

# 8. SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

# 8.1 Specification change procedures

Amendments shall be in the form of either a document containing an amended form of the CP or an update.

# 8.2 Publication and notification policies

See 1.4 for details.

# 8.3 CP approval procedures

The EPO's Security and Audit directorate shall be responsible for maintenance of the CP document.